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Casenote
COMMERCIAL LAW-WHEN APPROPRIATE WHY NOT APPLY
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE? Jordan v. Butler,
182 Neb. 626, 156 N.W.2d 778(1968).
I. INTRODUCTION
Jordan v. Butler1 concerns the right of a defrauded seller to re-
claim possession of cattle under the Uniform Commercial Code,2 and
how that right is affected by a security interest in the same cattle.
Austin Jordan, the plaintiff in this case, was an Alabama live-
stock dealer. On several occasions in the past few years, Jordan
sold cattle to either Jack Butler or to Jack Butler's Construc-
tion Company in Omaha, Nebraska. In March of 1966, Jordan con-
tracted to sell several hundred head of cattle to Jack Butler. Pir-
suant to the agreement, Jordan shipped the cattle to Gering, Ne-
braska, to a feedlot belonging to Duane Butler, a brother of Jack.
At the time the cattle were shipped from Alabama, Jordan drew
two sight drafts on the Butler Construction Company and mailed
them to Jack Butler's bank in Omaha. The seller was notified ten
days later by wire that the buyer in Omaha had dishonored both
drafts.
Jordan then traveled to Gering, Nebraska, where he made a
formal demand for a return of the cattle which he found reposing
in Duane Butler's feedlot. His demand having been refused, Jordan
filed suit against the Butler brothers claiming title to the cattle.
At this time, the District Court for Scottsbluff County issued a
restraining order that the cattle not be sold to any other person.
Prior to the trial, and in violation of the restraining order, Duane
traded the cattle for others of lighter weight and subsequently sold
the substituted cattle for cash. The proceeds of the sale were paid
into court.
The Nebraska Securities Company claimed a security interest in
the cattle and the proceeds of the cattle by virtue of a filed financ-
ing statement. The security company, after inspecting the cattle
in Duane's feedlot within a few days after they had arrived, had
advanced money to Duane Butler on the strength of a bill of sale
in favor of Duane signed by Jack's agent.
1 182 Neb. 626, 156 N.W.2d 778 (1968).
2 Citations are to the NEB. REv. STAT. (U.C.C. 1964) [hereinafter cited as
U.c.c.].
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The essence of Jordan v. Butler concerns a question of priority
between the right of the defrauded seller to regain possession of
the goods, if indeed such a right exists, and the claim of the secured
party who had advanced money on the strength of collateral with
no notice that the original seller was as yet unpaid. Based upon a
theory of constructive trust, the Nebraska Supreme Court held
that the secured party had a first lien on the fund which had
been paid into court, with the balance to be applied on the
judgment of Jordan against both Jack and Duane which had been
rendered for the amount of the sale price of the cattle which were
sold to Jack.3
Since the action was originally brought in equity, the decision
of the court is probably correct. The purpose of this article is not
to criticize the rationale used by the court, but rather to demon-
strate another feasible approach to the problems presented by the
factual situation in this case. This proposed solution would rely
instead upon the relevant sections of the Uniform Commercial Code
as adopted in Nebraska. It is hoped that in future cases which arise
with analogous factual circumstances, both the attorneys and the
court will take cognizance of these relevant sections of the U.C.C.
and place their reliance upon them in order to modernize the
thought processes relating to secured transactions and a defrauded
sellers' right to reclaim in Nebraska. The merits of the case were
both argued and decided wholly apart from the aid of these rele-
vant U.C.C. sections. It is submitted that since we have adopted
the U.C.C. in Nebraska, the sound reasoning available under its
sections should be implemented in future cases in order to provide
a much sounder basis for decision.
II. HOW THE CASE WAS ARGUED AND DECIDED
Instead of asserting a right to reclaim title to the goods under
any of the theories available, especially under U.C.C. sections 2-507
and 2-702, the unpaid seller, Jordan, argued that title to the cattle
was never divested from him. The court dismissed this contention
by quoting from section 2-401 (2) of the U.C.C.
Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the
time and place at which the seller contemplates his performance
with reference to the physical delivery of the goods, . . . (b) if
the contract requires delivery at destination, title passes on tender
there.4
Next, Jordan argued that upon dishonor of the draft, title to the
cattle revested in him by operation of law, citing section 2-401 (4)
3 182 Neb. at 638, 156 N.W.2d at 785-86.
4 Id. at 632, 156 N.W.2d at 783, quoting, U.C.C. § 2-401(2).
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of the Code.6 The court pointed out that this section does provide
for a revesting of title but only where there was a rejection or
refusal on the part of the buyer to receive or retain the goods, or
where there was a justified revocation of acceptance. The section
does not provide for a revesting of title merely for the non-payment
of the purchase price.
The security company argued that its security interest was para-
mount to any interest in favor of the original seller because the
company had acted in good faith with no knowledge of any con-
flicting claim against the collateral. Jordan contended that since
Duane had no rights in the collateral, he could not have given any
interest in the cattle to another, and that therefore the security
agreement meant nothing. The court answered these contentions
by stating that a mortgagee who acts in good faith with no notice
of the unpaid seller, "stands in the position of an innocent purchaser
of the property for value."6 However, a mortgagee who acts in good
faith is more than one who merely "stands in the position" of a
bona-fide purchaser for value-indeed, a mortgagee acting in good
faith is a bona-fide purchaser. Even though the unpaid and de-
frauded seller does have the right to reclaim title, a good faith
purchaser for value can cut off a reclaiming seller's rights, and it
is for this reason that the Nebraska Securities Company should pre-
vail over Jordan.
As to the distribution of the proceeds derived from the sale of
the substituted cattle, the court stated: "The fund standing in place
of the cattle stands in the nature of a constructive trust to be dis-
tributed in accordance with the priorities of the parties.' 7 Why did
the court not refer to section 9-306 (2) which specifically allows the
interest of a secured party to continue over to the proceeds of an
unauthorized sale of the collateral?
III. ARGUMENTS WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN PRESENTED
A. A DmrADnEm SELLER'S RIGHT TO REcLAim PossEssIoN
A seller who has parted with possession of his goods and has
lost his right to stop the goods in transit still has several theories
by which he can establish a right to possession. One such theory is
5 U.C.C. § 2-401(4): "A rejection or other refusal by the buyer to
receive or retain the goods, whether or not justified, or a justified
revocation of acceptance revests title to the goods in the seller. Such
revesting occurs by operation of law and is not a 'sale.'"
6 182 Neb. at 626, 156 N.W.2d at 780.
7 Id. at 637, 156 N.W.2d at 785.
8 See Smith, Title and the Right to Possession Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 10 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 39 (1968).
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through the enforcement of a security interest. If there is an agree-
ment that the seller retain a security interest in the goods, then
upon default the seller can take possession of the goods.9 If the
security interest is perfected under Article Nine,10 it can be enforced
in certain instances by the seller even against a subsequent good
faith purchaser." The Nebraska Securities Company did have a valid
security interest, but Jordan could have retained what would have
been a purchase money security interest, and this would have had
priority over the interest of the company if Jordan would have
taken the proper steps to file a financing statement and to notify
the other security holder, the company, of his intended purchase
money security interest prior to delivery.1 2 Since Jordan had taken
no steps to create or perfect such an interest, the company's interest
was paramount.
A second possible theory by which a seller can claim the right
to possession is the seller's common law right of replevin. But, in
order to maintain this type of action, the seller must retain title,
such as where title is retained as security for the payment of the
price under a conditional sales transaction. Section 2-401 (1) governs
situations where title is retained for security. This section provides
that any retention by the seller of the title in the goods shipped
to the buyer is limited to a security interest, which means that the
interest can be enforced against the purchaser only if the seller
takes the steps to perfect under Article Nine.
Many pre-code cases were decided on the basis of the "seller's
lien" concept. A person holding a so-called "seller's lien" was often
protected against even a good faith purchaser from the buyer.'
3
The Uniform Sales Act contained no provision for reclamation by
a seller by reason of insolvency or fraud of the buyer. It was gen-
erally assumed, however, that a defrauded seller could replevin
the goods sold as against the buyer himself, but that insolvency
without fraud was not a basis for rescission and replevin.14 It has
been held that an unpaid seller has an action for reclamation on
the basis of fraud.' 5 Amid some dispute, there is authority that a
9 U.C.C. § 9-503.
10 The rules concerning perfection are found in U.C.C. §§ 9-302 to -305.
11 U.C.C. §§ 9-201 to -301(1)(c).
12 U.C.C. §§ 9-203, -312(3).
13 McElwee v. Metropolitan Lumber Co., 69 F. 302 (6th Cir. 1895).
14 See 3 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GovERnNG SALES OF GOODS §§ 636-37
(rev. ed. 1948); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 471-76 (1932).
15 In re Meiselman, 105 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1939); Sternberg v. American
Snuff Co., 69 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1934); Manly v. Ohio Shoe Co., 25 F.2d
384 (4th Cir. 1928).
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hopelessly insolvent buyer, who received goods on credit, was
fraudulent if he knew payment was extremely unlikely and failed
to disclose that fact, even though he intended to pay if he could.16
Section 2-705 (1)17 may have some bearing on the Jordan-type
case. This section permits a stoppage of goods in transit by the
seller, but only when the goods are in the process of delivery and
before the buyer has acquired possession. It cannot be understood
as providing an independent recovery of goods already in the pos-
session of a buyer. The language "or if for any other reason the
seller has a right to withhold or reclaim the goods" indicates only
that a seller may stop the delivery of goods in transit or in the pos-
session of a bailee, where the conditions of withholding or recover-
ing from the buyer himself are otherwise satisfied.
Reclamation could conceivably be based also on section 2-703,
which permits a seller to "cancel" in the event of certain kinds
of default by the buyer, but the definition of "cancellation" in sec-
tion 2-106(4) in terms of "termination" seems to limit its effect
to discharge of "obligations which are still executory on both
sides .... ",18
A seller who delivers goods to his buyer without securing their
price in exchange may find himself in serious difficulty. For in-
stance, suppose that goods are delivered on credit to a buyer whom
the seller believes is solvent. Since a judgment for the price may
be collectable for only a few cents on the dollar, the seller would
naturally prefer to recover the goods themselves. Section 2-702
provides the seller with this remedy.19 Likewise when the sales
16 See California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo, 62 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1933).
17 U.C.C. § 2-705(1) provides: "The seller may stop delivery of foods
[sic] in the possession of a carrier or other bailee when he discovers
the buyer to be insolvent (Section 2-702) and may stop delivery of
carload, truckload, planeload or larger shipments of express or freight
when the buyer repudiates or fails to make a payment due before
delivery or if for any other reason the seller has a right to withhold or
reclaim the goods."
18 U.C.C. § 2-106(3). See Braucher, Reclamation of Goods from a Fraud-
ulent Buyer, 65 MicH. L. REV. 1281, 1290 (1967).
19 U.C.C. §§ 2-702(2), -702(3) (emphasis added): "(2) Where the seller
discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent
he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after
the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the
particular seller in writing within three months before delivery the
ten day limitation does not apply. Except as provided in this sub-
section the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods on the buyer's
fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to
pay.
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contract requires the buyer to pay on receipt of the goods, should
he not pay as agreed, the seller's only meaningful remedy may
be whatever right he has to recover the goods. Here again section
2-507(2) makes this remedy available to the seller.20 Section
2-511 (3) provides that "payment by check is conditional and is
defeated as between the parties by dishonor of the check on due
presentment." A seller is, therefore, able to reclaim if he has paid
with a check or a draft that is later dishonored.
However, the seller's right to recover goods delivered to an
insolvent or defaulting buyer is subject to an important limitation.
By obtaining delivery of the goods the buyer secures the power to
defeat the seller's right to reach them. Should the buyer resell, the
seller's claim will be lost, provided that the subpurchaser is un-
aware of this claim.21 Under section 2-403 (1),22 a subpurchaser, by
showing that the "goods have been delivered under a transaction
of purchase" or that he is a "good faith purchaser for value," makes
out his right to take and hold the goods free of the seller's claim.
(3) The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to
the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser
or lien creditor under this article (section 2-403). Successful reclama-
tion of goods excludes all other remedies with respect to them."
For a good discussion of reclamation under section 2-702, see Smith,
Title and the Right to Possession Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. R.v. 39 (1968). See also Comment, Section
2-702(2): A Seller's Prima Facie Case and the Obligation of Good
Faith, 10 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 634 (1969).
20 U.C.C. § 2-507(2): "Where payment is due and demanded on the de-
livery to the buyer of goods or documents of title, his right as against
the seller to retain or dispose of them is conditional upon his making
the payment due."
U.C.C. § 2-507, Comment 3 provides a cross-reference to § 2-702:
"Subsection (2) deals with the effect of a conditional delivery by the
seller and in such a situation makes the buyer's 'right as against the
seller' conditional upon payment. These words are used as words of
limitation to conform with the policy set forth in the bona fide
purchase sections of this article. Should the seller after making such
a conditional delivery fail to follow up his rights, the condition is
waived. The provision of this article for a ten day limit within which
the seller may reclaim goods delivered on credit to an insolvent
buyer is also applicable here."
21 U.C.C. §§ 2-702(3), -507(2). See also U.C.C. § 2-507, Comment 3.
22 U.C.C. § 2-403(1): "A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his
transferor had or had power to transfer except that a purchaser of a
limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest
purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good
title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been
delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser [retains]
such power. .. "
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In addition, section 2-403 (2)23 might also be applicable since de-
livery to the buyer would amount to an "entrusting of possession of
goods... ." If the buyer were a "merchant who deals in goods of
that kind," he would secure power to resell the goods free of the
seller's claim provided that the said purchaser was a "buyer in
[the] ordinary course of business."2'
Section 2-702 views the purchase of goods by an insolvent,
who is ordinarily unable to pay for them in the regular course of
business, as fraudulent. The seller has a right to reclaim the goods
if he makes a demand upon the buyer for the return of the goods
within ten days after they are received by the buyer. However, the
insolvent buyer has a power to transfer a good title to a good faith
purchaser for value, or to a buyer in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, or sometimes to a lien creditor,25 so as to defeat the rights of
the seller. The holder of a security interest in the buyer's inventory
is a "purchaser" according to In re Hayward Woolen Co.,26 and has
rights superior to those of the seller, even though the seller had
made demand for the return of the goods within ten days after
delivery. Sections 2-507 and 2-702 are usually read together to give
an unpaid seller the right to reclaim. In one case the buyer of a
group of used cars gave checks to the sellers in full payment. The
checks were later rendered uncollectable by the action of the
buyer's agent, an automobile auction company to which the cars
had been turned over for sales, by stopping payment of checks given
by it to the buyer as advances to finance his acquisition of the
vehicles. The Kentucky court held that the buyer was "insolvent"
within the meaning of sections 2-702 and 2-507(2) until the cars
were resold within ten days after the transaction between the
buyers and the sellers.27 The court stated:
23 U.C.C. § 2-403(2): "Any entrusting of possession of goods to a mer-
chant who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all
rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business."
24 U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
25 The 1966 amendment to the official U.C.C. deleted "or lien creditor"
following "good faith purchaser" in the first sentence of section
2-702 (3). Under the result reached in In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820
(3d Cir. 1960), the right of reclamation granted by this section was
almost entirely illusory. See note 31 infra. A conforming change was
made in paragraph 3 of the Official Comment to Section 2-702. The
following jurisdictions have adopted this 1966 Official Text Amend-
ment: Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Maine,
North Dakota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
and Wyoming.
26 3 U.C.C. Rptr. 1107 (E.D. Mass. 1967).
27 Greater Louisville Auto Auction, Inc. v. Ogle Buick, Inc., 387 S.W.2d
17 (Ky. 1965).
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UCC § 2-507(2) provides that when payment for goods is due
and demanded on delivery, as between the parties the buyer's right
to retain or dispose of the property is "conditional upon his making
the payment due." . . . In such circumstances the UCC does not
specifically reserve to the seller a right of reclamation. However,
Comment 3 to UCC § 2-507 suggests that the seller's rights are
the same as provided in UCC § 2-702, relating to sale on credit to
an insolvent buyer, and we agree that surely the rights of an
unpaid seller under UCC § 2-507(2) must be no less than in the
case of a sale falling within the express terms of UCC § 207(2).28
There are two Pennsylvania cases,29 where section 2-507 alone
was treated as providing an independent basis for reclamation. In
the first case, the court pointed out that the petition for reclamation
was filed within ten days; in the second, it was not, but the court
held applicable the presumption of section 3-503 (2) that thirty days
is a reasonable time for presentment of a check. In the latter case,
the purchaser of goods on a C.O.D. basis gave the seller a check,
which, although deposited with due diligence and although there
was sufficient money on deposit, was never paid because of the
purchaser's filing of a bankruptcy petition two days later. The court
held that the seller had the right to reclaim the goods sold under
section 2-507 (2) and hence was entitled to recover from the trustee
in bankruptcy the value of the goods which the trustee had sold
by agreement with the seller.
Even if a defrauded seller asserting his right to reclaim can
satisfy the specific requirements of sections 2-702 (2) and 2-507 (2),
he would not have priority over a prior perfected security interest
since section 2-702 provides that the seller's right to reclaim under
subsection (2) is subject to the right of a buyer in ordinary course
or other good faith purchaser or lien creditor. 0 The law in many
states gives certain lien creditors a higher claim than that of a de-
frauded seller. In view of the "ideal creditor" section of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, a trustee in bankruptcy has the rights of such lien
creditor and is entitled to the proceeds from the sale of a seller's
goods, even if the credit sale was induced by a positive misrepre-
sentation by the bankrupt as to his solvency. 31 It is because of In re
Kravit 3 2 and similar cases that the 1966 amendments deleting
the words "or lien creditor" have been proposed.
28 Id. at 20.
29 In re Lindenbaum's Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rptr. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1964); In re Mort
Co., 208 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
30 See note 25 supra.
3' In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960); In re Behring & Behring,
5 U.C.C. Rptr. 600 (N.D. Tex. 1968). Contra, Pacific Finance Corp. v.
Edwards, 304 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1962).
32 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960).
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In order for the plaintiff-seller to avail himself of the protection
of section 2-507 (2), payment must be "due" and "demanded" upon
the delivery of the goods. In Stumbo v. Paul B. Hutt Lumber Co.,83
an independent logger had delivered logs to a saw mill without
demanding payment. It was the custom and usage in the logging
industry for independent loggers selling logs on the open market to
sawmills to be paid on the twenty-fifth of each month for logs de-
livered between the first and the fifteenth of that month, and on the
tenth day of each month for logs delivered between the sixteenth
and the last day of the preceding month. The court held that on
these facts, the loggers were not entitled to recover the goods from
the sawmill under section 2-507(2) since payment was neither
"due" nor "demanded" on the delivery of the logs.
The ten day provision in section 2-702 is very crucial. If the
seller releases the goods to a buyer in return for a check for the
purchase price, and the check is dishonored, not because of the
buyer's insolvency, but because of insufficient funds, the seller's right
to reclaim the goods is waived unless he makes a demand for their
return within ten days after delivery of the goods.0 4 In re Helms
Veneer Corp3" held that since section 2-507 gives the seller the right
to reclaim his goods where a check, subsequently dishonored, has
been accepted for payment in a cash transaction, the right to reclaim
is limited to a ten day period from delivery of the goods as pro-
vided in section 2-507 by virtue of its cross-reference to section 2-702.
If the right has not been exercised within the time specified, the
right is waived. The seller's remedy is then on the instrument as
well as for breach of contract, and seller's rights are reduced to
those of a general creditor.
It has been held that the seller's right to reclaim goods under
section 2-702 of the Code does not require that there be an actual
taking of possession during the ten day period.3 6 Such an interpre-
tation would require vendors to use devious means to gain the
actual physical possession of goods within the ten day period, and
the very thing section 2-702 is designed to effectuate would be
deemed a prerequisite to its invocation. It has been held by one
court that a check given by the buyer can be considered a "writing"
33 86 Ore. 1321, 444 P.2d 564 (1968).
34 In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1968).
35 Id.
36 Metropolitan Distributors v. Eastern Supply Co., 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 128
(C.P. Allegheny County 1959). The U.C.C. does not provide a rule for
computing time by days.
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within the meaning of section 2-702 (2), so that the ten day limita-
tion does not apply.3 7
B. Tim VALIDITY OF THE SECURITY COMPANY'S SECURITY AGREEMENT
The court would appear to be correct in holding that the title
to the cattle passed to the buyer upon delivery of the cattle, and
that Jack Butler was able to convey at least a voidable title to his
brother, Duane, under section 2-403 (1). Even though Duane might
not have qualified as a good faith purchaser since he may have been
a party to the fraud,38 he too had at least a voidable title and was
able to create a valid security interest in a third party such as the
security company which qualified as a good faith purchaser for
value. Even if Duane had not had title, a security interest may be
given as to goods which are not the property of the debtor.39
In order for the company to secure an interest in the cattle deliv-
ered by Jordan to Duane, there must be an agreement that it attach,
that value be given, and that the debtor, Duane, has rights in the
collateral.40 The first two conditions are clearly satisfied. On the
issue of whether the debtor has rights in the collateral, we look to
the earlier provision of the Code, section 1-201 (37), which states
that the retention or reservation of title by a seller of goods not-
withstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer is limited in effect
to a reservation of a security interest. In the present case there was
37 Theo. Hamm Brewing Co. v. First Trust & Savings Bank, 103 Ill. App.
2d 190, 242 N.E.2d 911 (1968). For a contrary interpretation of the
holdings of this case, see Comment, Section 2-702(2): A Seller's Prima
Facie Case and the Obligation of Good Faith, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L.
REv. 634, 645 (1969).
38 "Duane and Licht both testify and Jack admits that Jack received
the $17,000 which originated from the loan made by the Securities
Company to Duane.... Jack was unable to show with any certainty
that he ever received the $3,000 in cash .... The testimony that the
$3,000 was given to Nedbalek for cattle does not appear consistent
under the circumstances. The stories of paying out items of $3,000
and $3,250 in cash at casual meetings on the street and the differences
in the testimony of Jack, Duane and Licht lead us to the conclusion
that the two cash payments were never made and that the testimony
to the contrary was false.... After a consideration of all the facts and
circumstances, including the testimony proven to be false and that
which is so incredible as to be beyond belief, we can come to no
other conclusion than that the transaction reeks with fraud. .. ."
Jordan v. Butler, 182 Neb. 626, 634-36, 156 N.W.2d 778, 784-85 (1968).
39 U.C.C. §§ 9-105(1)(d), -112. See also Mauch v. First National Bank of
Prague, 4 U.C.C. Rptr. 831 (1967), which involved the validity of a
secured party's interest in cattle which were actually owned by the
debtor's brother.
40 U.C.C. § 9-204(1).
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delivery of the cattle to Duane. Duane acquired possession of the
cattle which were delivered pursuant to an agreement of sale.
Under these circumstances, Duane had "rights" in the collateral,
and therefore, the company's security interest was able to attach
to the cattle at the moment they were delivered to Duane.41 The
"perfection" of the company's interest was not in issue, however,
but it had taken "all the applicable steps required for perfec-
tion. .... "42
The court found it necessary to resort to a "constructive trust"
theory in holding that the company's interest continued in the cattle
which had been substituted for the original collateral and in the
proceeds derived from the sale of the substituted cattle. The same
result could have been reached under section 9-306 (2):
[A] security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale
... by the debtor unless his action was authorized by the secured
party ... and also continues in any identifiable proceeds .... 43
The court could easily have found that the substituted cattle and
the proceeds derived from the sale of the substituted cattle were
"identifiable proceeds" of the sale of the original collateral.
It may be true that the company's interest in the proceeds
would have become unperfected after the sale because it did not
perfect an interest in those proceeds within ten days as required
by section 9-306(3), 44 assuming that the original security agree-
41 Professor Gilmore believes that a debtor who has a "special property
interest" in goods pursuant to § 2-501 has a 'right" in such goods as
collateraL 1 G. GLMwoRE, SECURTY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
§ 11.5 (1965).
42 U.C.C. § 9-303. Perfection by filing is covered in § 9-401(1). Section
9-402 deals with the formal requisites to the financing statement and
also requires a description of the collateral.
43 U.C.C. § 9-306(2). In view of § 9-306, it could be said that the trans-
feree of the collateral would take free of the security interest and be
safe against repossession or an action for conversion, but that a right
to proceeds would survive. See U.C.C. § 9-307(1) which allows a buyer
in the ordinary course of business to take free of a security interest
created by his vendor despite knowledge of that interest. For a detailed
treatment of the "proceeds" problem, see Gillombardo, The Treatment
of Uniform Commercial Proceeds in Bankruptcy: A Proposed Redraft
of Section 9-306, 38 U. CN. L. REv. 1 (1969).
44 U.C.C. § 9-306(3): "The security interest in proceeds is a continuously
perfected security interest if the interest in the original collateral was
perfected but it ceases to be a perfected security interest and becomes
unperfected ten days after receipt of the proceeds by the debtor unless
(a) a filed financing statement covering the original collateral also
covers proceeds; or (b) the security interest in the proceeds is per-
fected before the expiration of the ten day period."
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ment did not cover proceeds. But even an unperfected security
interest would have prevailed over the claim of the seller who had
already been cut off because the company is able to qualify as a
"good faith purchaser for value" within the meaning of section
2-702 (3).45
The basis on which the court ordered judgment against both
Duane and Jack is not clear. Duane was not a purchaser from
Jordan, but apparently the judgment against him is based upon
the court's finding that Duane was a party to some sort of fraud4 6
against the seller. The dissenting Justices were of the view that this
issue was not properly before the court.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision announced by the court in Jordan cites only two
U.C.C. provisions: section 2-401, which deals with title to goods, and
section 2-403, the voidable title statute. The plaintiff claimed title
to the cattle as the basis of his action, but he failed to mention
sections 2-507 and 2-702 which deal specifically with an unpaid
seller's right to reclaim goods within a limited period of time. Even
had the plaintiff argued correctly, the security company was capable
of taking priority over Jordan, because the former is able to qualify
as a good faith purchaser and could therefore come in ahead of
the unpaid seller's right of reclamation as provided by section 2-702.
Although the company had argued in its brief4 7 that its security
45 The term "purchaser" is broad enough to include a secured party.
U.C.C. §§ 1-201(32), -201 (33). See note 26 svpra.
46 "Duane testifies that the 198 cattle on hand at the time of trial were
the cattle delivered to him by Jordan the previous March. This evi-
dence is conclusively established as wholly false. The cattle delivered
by Jordan were sold to Blalock and delivered in Colorado as instructed
by Blalock. Duane bought the 198 head of 400-pound heifers and
substituted them for the cattle bought from Jordan. It is evident that
Duane substituted the light cattle for the heavier cattle in order that
he could convert the difference in value into cash to the extent of
$11,299.74, which he did. The substituted cattle were purchased to
satisfy the lien of the Security Company which appeared necessary
to avoid criminal prosecution for selling and moving the Jordan
cattle without the consent of the lienor. His fear that Jordan's insti-
tution of suit might have resulted in the taking of his whole interest
in the cattle for payment of his liabilities seems to have motivated
the unlawful sale of the Jordan cattle in violation of the district court
injunction. It is evident also that Duane did not feel that his claim that
he was a good faith purchaser for value was free of his own doubt
to the extent that he could safely rely on it." 182 Neb. at 636, 156
N.W.2d at 784-85. See also note 38 supra.
47 Brief for Appellant, Nebraska Securities Company, at 24, 26, Jordan v.
Butler, 182 Neb. 626, 156, N.W.2d 778 (1968).
CASENOTE
interest in the cattle extended to the proceeds derived from the
sale of the cattle under the "proceeds" provision of the U.C.C., sec-
tion 9-306, the court resorted to "constructive trust" rationale to
resolve the issue in favor of the secured party.
Jordan v. Butler was a case which should have been decided
under the Uniform Commercial Code. The citing of U.C.C. pro-
visions in the briefs from both sides was numerous, but neither
party actually cited the relevant sections. Jordan should have
argued his Code rights of reclamation of goods when the buyer
defaults, as it was the clearest way of presenting whatever case
he had. Nebraska Securities Company should have been able to
demonstrate its status as a "purchaser" and therefore been able to
prevail over even an unpaid seller. The court could have at least
mentioned the "proceeds" section of the Code as it had been argued
by counsel for the security company. The certainty and predict-
ability of the Code, as it is being interpreted by the many cases that
are decided in this area, should certainly form a stronger basis on
which attorneys can rely than do the nebulous, ambiguous, and
hard-to-prove theories such as were argued in this case.
Kenneth C. Fritzler II '70
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